Credit policies in Japan and Korea : a review of the literature by Vittas, Dimitri & Wang, Bo
Policy, Research,  and External Affairs  I
-WORKIM  PAPE'RS






in Japan and Korea




Well-functioning bureaucracies, effective monitoring,  and  a
high degree  of  financial  discipline have contributed  to  the
effectiveness of credit polities in Japan and Korea. But the two
countries' credit policies are not without their critics.
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the authors, rerlect  only their views, and should he used and cited accordingly. T  he findings, interpretations, and conclusions are  the
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This paper-a  product of the Financial Policy and Systems Division,  Country Economics Department
- is part of a larger effort in PRE to study the impact of regulation in the financial sector.  Copies are
available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Wilai
Pitayatonakam, room N9-003, extension 37666 (22 pages).
Japan and Korea have long been associated with  terms as a result of the Ministry of International
extensive, generally successful government  Trade and Industry's (MITI) iptervention; they
intervention in the financial system.  But their  challenge the view that Japan's high growth and
credit policies have not gone uncriticized.  Vittas  successful industrialization were mastermninded
and Wang survey the literaturc available in  by MITI.
English on the operation and effectiveness of  In the literature on the effectiveness of credit
credit policics in these two countries. They  and industrial policy in Korea, very few authors,
divide the literature on the Japanese experience  if any, challenge the view that government
into three groups.  interventioni  was extensive in Korea.  Indeed,
Papers in the first group argue that govern-  many autiors  argue that government intervention
ment intervention facilitated the financing of  miay  halve  retarded growth by distorting incen-
industry and promoted rapid industrialization  tives and resource allocation.
during the period of reconstruction and high  An important feature of credit policy in
growth.  These papers emphasizc the role of  Korca was the coercive naturc of government
indirect finance, the "overloan" position of the  intervention.  Firms that failed to meet perfor-
large city banks (their reliance on credits from  mance standards and expand exports were denied
the Bank of Japan for funding their loans to  additional credit or had their loans recalled,
industrial corporations); the "ovcrborrowing" or  while successful firms were given further access
high leverage of industrial companies; and the  to credit on prcferential termns.  Interest rate
artificially low level of interest rates.  subsidies in Korca, unlike Japan, were some-
The second group includes papers that  times quite large.
accept that governmcnt intervention influenced  Criticism of Korean credit policy focuses on
financial flows, but maintain that its impact was  the cxpericnce in Wic  late 1970s when the drive
not as great as the first group implied.  Some  for heavy industrialization was under way.
papers deny that govemment maintained artifi-  Several papers argue that the drive was
cially low interest rates.  Others argue that access  overambitious and costly and resulted in a
to funds and the cowbell effect were far more  serious misallocation of resources, although
important than credit subsidics.  Most papers in  many of the targets were in fact achieved.
this group also argue that private financial  In general the relative success of credit
institutions played a leading part in financing thc  policies in Japan and Korea is attributed to their
growing or modem sectors of industry and that  well-functioning bureaucracies, effective moni-
most government support was directed toward  tofing, and financial discipline.  These have
declining and stagnant industries.  limited the diversion of subsidized credit funds
lihc third group of papers attributes a  into speculalive assets and have cnsured that
negative effect to governmcnt policy and main-  credit policies in these two countries have not
tains that economic growth would have been  sulfered from the problems of adverse selection
even higher if the financial markets were not  and moral hazard that have bedeviled directed
subject to extensive regulation.  Several papers  credit programis  and credit subsidies in other
argue that Japan's  industrial adjustment process  countries.
was slower and probably much costlier in social
The PRE Working Paper Series disseminates the  inlndings  of work un(ler wvay  in Ihc Bank's  Policy, Research, and Extemal
AffairsComplex. Anobjectiveorihe  scries is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations arc Iess Lhan  rullypolished.
The findings, intcrprctations, and conclusions in hliese  papers do not necessarily repicsent official Bank policy.
P'roduced  by the PRE Dissemination  CentCrCredit Policies  in Japan  and Korea:
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References  1 9Thli  paper  offers  a  brlef  survey  of the literature  that is available  in
English  on the  operatLon  and  effectLveness  of credit  polLcies  ln  Japan  and
Korea. There La  a vast,  and somewhat  confusLng,  literature  on thli  subject,
whlch  Le closely  related  to the issue  of the  effectiveness  of lndustrlal
pollcy  ln  the two  countrLes.
There  is a  certaln  differentiatLon  ln the literature  between  Japan  and
Korea  that  probably  reflects  the dLfferent  intensity  of governent
interventLon  Ln  the two  countries. For  thLi  reason,  the  paper  will  deal
separately  wlth  the experience  of the two  countrles.
The purpose  of thLi paper  is  not  to provide  a comprehensive  survey  of
the 1lterature  but rather  to summarize  the  maLn arguments  Ln favor  and  agaLnst
the  propooLtion  that  government  LnCervention  ln  credit  pollcy  can  be effective
ln  promoting  Lndustrlalization.  In  doLng  so,  the  paper  will focus  on a number
of contrLbutions  that are  representative  of the  positLons  taken  by different
authors.
The  aaeeeoiee
The literature  on credit  policles  Ln  Japan  can  be divLded  lnto  three
maln  groups.
The  fLrst  group  covers  those  papers  that argue  that  government
LnterventLon  ln the financLal  system  played  a cruclal  part in facilLtating  the
financing  of Lndustry  and  promoting  rapid  LndustrLalizatLon  durLng  the  period
of high  growth.
The second  group Lncludes  papers  that accept  that  government
lnterventLon  influenced  financLal  flows,  but  maLntaln  that  ito impact  was  not
as large  as LmplLed  by the first  group.  Some  papers  deny  that  government
polliy  maLntained  artificLally  low  Lnterest  rates  ana  emphaslze  that  most
government  support  was directed  towards  declining  and  stagnant  Lndustries
rather  than  the  dynamLc  sectors  that  mostly  contributed  to economic  growth.
FLnally,  the  third  group  attrlbutes  a  negative  effect  to government
policy  and  malntalne  that  economic  growth  would  have  been  even higher  lf  the
financLal  markets  were  not subject  to extensLve  regulatLons.
Japanese  credit  and LndustrLal  pollcy  has  evolved  over  tLme in response
to  the  changing  needs  and structure  of the  economy. Industrial  pollcy  and
direct  government  allocatLon  of funds  were  more important  during  the
reconstructLon  perLo.d  between  1945  and 1955. Government  policy  ope-ated  in  a
less  dlrect  fashLon  during  the  perLod  of high  growth  between  1955  and 1973,
although  the financLal  system  was  rigidly  segmented  and subject  to wide-
ranging  controls  on Lnterest  rates. Flnally,  since  the  mid'l970s,  credit
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1policy  has  become  lsee  interventionist  and  a  olow  but steady  process  of
fLnancial LberaLization  has  been  under  way.
The  Japan.g.  fLnancLal  system  had  during  the  high growth  era a  number  of
features  that 9 though  not  unique  to lt,  combLned  toiether  to give it  a
character  that was quite  dlitlnct  from  that of  Anglo-American  or contLnental
European  financial  systems. SuzukL  (1980)  has  long LdentLfied  four such
characteristLcs  Ln  the  preponderant  role  of  Lndirect  finance,  the 'overloano
positLon  of the large  clty  banks,  i.e.  their  reliance  on credits  from  the  Bank
of Japan for  fundlng  thelr  loans  to industrlal  corporatlons,  the
overborrowing"  or hLgh levtrage  of  industrLal  companLes,  and the  artLfLcially
low level  of interest  rates  *  Other  authors  have  emphasized  the  role  played
by  the  maLn  bank system,  the close  relations  between  banks  and industry,  the
different  rolas  played  by debt and  equLty  in the  Japanese  fLnancLal  system  and
the fLnancial  intermedlary  role  of large  conglomerate  groups,  especially  the
general  trading  companies,  in  channelling  funds  to small  firms  at the
perLphery  of different  groups  (Aoki  1988  and  1990,  Horiuchi  et al 1988,
HoriuchL  1989,  Corbett  1987,  Elston  1981,  Vittas  and  Brown  1982).
Thli paper  focusses  on a review  of  papers  that  dLicuse  the  dLrection  of
credLt  funds  and  the use  of Lnterest  rate subsidLes. It does  not consLder  the
arguments  about  the role  of the  main  bank system  and  the  other  related  issues,
even  though  some  of these  issues  have  been  covered  ln some  the  papers
rvLiewed.
The first  aroup.  The  most positive  statement  about  the  role  of
governmnt polLy  ln  promotlng  &ndustrialLzation  is contained  ln  an OECD
report  on Japanese  LndustrLal  policy  (OECD,  1972w  pp. 11-31). In lt,  the  then
Viee MLnLster  of MITI stated  that  MITI decided  to establish  in Japan
industrLes  whlch  required  extensive  employment  of  capltal  and  technology,  such
as steel,  oll reflnlng,  petrochemicals,  automobiles,  alrcraft,  Lndustrial
machLnery of all sorts, and electronLcs, including electronic computers.
The statement also emphaeized that from a short-run, static viewpoint,
encouragement of such industries would seem to conflict with economic
rationalism, but from a  long-range viewpoint, these were precLely  the
Lndustries  where  Lncome  elasticity  of demand  was high,  technologLcal  progress
rapLd, and growth of labor productivity fast.  The polLcLes used by MITI
included  import protection coupled wLth export promotion, controls on foreLgn
Lnvestment  and on  purchases  of  foreign technology, financial aLd to selected
I  Various authors have challenged in recent years the existence or
uniqueness of these characteristics.  As discussed below, Horiuchi disputes
the  proposLtLon  that Lntereat  rates  were low.  Ikeo (1987)  mentLons  several
studies  ln  Japanese  that  argue  that indirect  finance  is  not  a  uniquely
Japanese  phenomenon  but is  commonly  observed  in advanced  flnancial  systems.
FLnally,  Kuroda  and  Oritani (1980)  have long  challenged  the  view  that the
leverage  of Japanese  companies  was  unduly  high.  Allowing  for  differencee  in
the valuatLon  of assets  and  other  accountLng  practLces,  they found  that
Japanese  leverage  was  much closer  to levels  prevaLling  Ln European  countries
and not  much lower  than  AmerLcan  levels.
2industriee  through  government  lending  institutions,  selective  tax incentives,
and  adminiftrative  leadership  to prevent  excesses  in investment  and
production
EColeetOn  (1986)  refors  to the  positive  dsecrimination  of policy  by
asserting  that elite  firma  in  engineering,  shipbuilding,  steel  and  motor
vehicles  were given  state  aid  on a massive  scale,  were sheltered  from  the
ravages  of competiti3n  by import  tariffs,  and  were protected  from  cyclical
recessione  by state-organized  cartels  (p.  62).  Ecclenton  does  not  provide
many detaile  to support  his  statement  but  Magaziner  and  Hout (1980)  contain  an
analysis  of government  support  that  corroborates  some  of Eccleston's  claims.
Magaziner  and  Hout cover  government  policy  and  interve.stion  in  the steel,
shipbuilding,  motor  care (including  car  parts),  industrial  machinery  and
information  electronics  industries.  Although  they  do not  always  give specific
details  about  the  extent  of financial  support  provided  to different
industries,  they contain  an extensive  discusoion  of  various  policy  actions
3
taken  that  often  went  much  beyond  the  provision  of finance
The financial  support  offered  to industry  took several  different  forms,
both direct  and  indirect. Many  authors  have argued  that  the  cost  of funde  to
indIustry  'iao  kept  low  by the  general  regulation  of deposit  and lending
interest  rates  and  by the  use  of preferential  credit  facilities  that  were
directed  at particular  sectors. Suzuki  (1980)  stated  that in  postwar  Japan,
and  particularly  after  1955,  the level  of interest  rates  was  kept low  with the
deliberate  aims  of reducing  the  cost  of manufactured  exports  and stimulating
investment  (p.  37).  Royama  (1984)  viewed  the  artificially  low  interest  rate
policy  as an important  element  of the  Japanese  financial  system  that made  the
control  of the  Bank  of Japan  more  effective  and stimulated  the financing  of
high  growth  industries  (p.  4) .
The rigid  segmentation  of the  Japanese  financial  system  facilitated  the
operation  of credit  policy. The large  city  banks  specialized  in lending  to
2  It is not  clear  from  the  OECD statement  when  MITI  decided  to
consciously  develop  comparative  advantage  in high-value-added  industries.
Zysman  (1983)  quotes  a paper  by Ueno (1980)  in  which  the  argument  L  presented
that  the  BOJ  objected  to the  policies  of MITI on the  grounds  that the
industries  recommended  by MITI  were "the  most inappropriate  industries  for
Japan  then in the  eyes  of the state  theory  of comparative  cost"  (p  240).  On
the other  hand,  Trezise  and  Suzuki  (1976)  implied  a certain  ex post
rationalization  by describing  the  MITI statement  as an authoritative
retrospective  statement  of MITI's  accomplishments  (p.  793).
3  Magaziner  and  Hout  note,  however,  that industrial  policy  was not
always  successful  and  also  mention  that  many industries  (consumer  electronics,
motorcyclea,  and  copiers)  thrived  without  a  significant  government  role (p.
54).
4  However,  it is interesting  to note  that  Royama  argues  in  a later
paper  that "while  it  may first  appear  evident,  actually  the policy  of
artiLficially  low interest  rates  is quite  vague"  (1988,  p. 78).
3large  firms. They  benefitted  from  the regulation  of deposit  rates  but  they
were  prevented  from  collectlng  too  many depooLts  by branching  restrLetLons
that  protected  the  posLtLon  of small  banks.  Inatead,  elty  banks  relLed  on 8OJ
financing  for  complementLng  theLi  deposit  funds. For  most  of the hlgh-growth
era,  elty  banks  operated  wlth what is  known  as an "overloan"  positLon. Many
authors,  lncludlng  Eccleston  and Zysman,  have clalmed  that  the "overloan"
system  gave  the BOJ  considerable  leverage  over  the lendLng  polLeLs of the
large  commercLal  banks. Through  moral  suasion  and  admLnLitratLve  guLdance,
S0W could  encourage  the  banks  to lend  to some sectors  or to refraLn  from
landLng  to others.
Long-term  industrLal  finance,  for  both flxed  investment  and  workLng
capital,  was  provided  by the long-term  credit  banks. These  were private
financial  Lnstitutions  that  were  allowed  to rals  funds  through  issuing
medium-term  debentures. They  often  provided  complementary  finance  to that
made avaLlable  by the  commercial  banks  and  the government  financial
LnstLtutions. In fact,  in  many cases,  the long-term  credlt  banks  played  an
important  part ln identifying  companies  and  projects  worthy  of financLal
support.
FLnancial  support  to sectors  that  dld  not  have access  to  the large  city
banks  was provLded  by small  regional  and  local  commercLal  banks,  by  many types
of mutual  institutLons  that speclalLzed  in offerLng  financlal  servLces  to
small  fLrms,  farmers  and  workers,  and  by several  government  financLal
instLtutions  that speclalLzed  in lending  to high  prLorlty  sectors,  .. uch  as
exports  and investment  projects  as well as  to agriculture,  small  busln so  and
houaLng.
Government  financial  institutlons  were  mostly  funded  from  the Trust  Fund
Bureau  which  managed  the  resources  collected  by the  postal  savLngs  bank,  the
postal  Lnsurance  servLce  and  the social  security  system. The flnancial
support  of the Trust  Fund  Bureau  was  operated  through  the Flical  Investment
and  Loan  Program,  which  lay  outside  rigid  budgetary  restrictLons. According
to Eccleston  (p.  67)  and  Okimoto (1986,  p. 60),  FILP loans  accounted  for
roughly  30%  of total  capital  to industry  in  the 1950s,  although  OkLmoto  also
states  that the share  of FILP  loans  fell  to just  over 10%  ln the 1980g.
Johnson  (1978)  states  that Ln the  perLod  from  1953  to 1961,  the  government
supplied  through  FILP  loans  between  38% (1953)  and  21% (1961)  of all  capital
Lnvested  in new  Lndustrial  plants  and  equipment  (p.  98).
Eccleston  also  underscores  the  dualLitic  nature  of Japanese  industry,
which  conaLsted  of a relatLvely  small  number  of large  conglomerate  groups  that
were  usually  protected  durlng  economic  recessLons  and  a large  number  of
independent  small  flrms  that  suffered  the  brunt  of economic  declines.
As already  noted,  medium-size  and  small  firms  belonging  to
dLfferent  conglomerate  groups,  or having  long-term  production  and  marketing
contractual  relatLons  with  them,  received  financial,  and  other  kinds  of
support  (production  desLgn,  marketLng,  etc.)  from  the  general  trading
companLes.
4The 8econd arouo.  The  basic position of the second group Ls that
government Lnterventien ln credit polLey has influenced financial flows but
its impact has 'ot been particularly large.  The main proponents of  this  view
have  been  Teran.shL and PatrLck.  Horiuchi also belongs to tCABs  group,
although he appears to have challenged more forcefully than other authors
several aspects of the conventional interpretation of Japanese credit pollcy.
Teranishl (1986 and 1990) has argued that the major part of the  funds of
private financial institutions was directed towards the growing or modern
sectors of industry, especially those producing investment goods and
exportables, and this was more or less the consequence of the free play of
market forces.  Government guidance or intervention was never truly effective,
while  most of  the funde of government flnance were supplied to declining
industries, to low productivity sectors (agriculture and small firms) or for
buildlng the industrial infrastructure, such as electricLty, etc. (pp 156-7).
The  same polnt  is made by Horiuchi  (1984a)  who has emphasized that government
financial support was directed towards declining or stagnant industries and
has disputed the claim that Japanese financial policy tended to favor both big
banks and big businesses for the purpose of promoting economic growth  (p. 30).
Teranishi drew attention to two Lmportant features of finance to
declining sectors: first, because of indivisibility of production factors, the
rate of return in declining industries is lower during the adjtistment  period;
and second, declining industries suffer from greater information problems.
Both  of  these features deprive declining industries of adequate market
finance, a gap that is filled by government finance.  Thus,  Teranishi
emphasized the division of labor between private and public financial
institutions, but also warned that government finance to declining industrie
may have led to prolonged adjustment periods and excessLve investments in
declining sectors.
Teraniehi also discussed the stance of monetary policy and the question
of who benefitted from the impllcit subsidies of regulated deposit rates.  As
regards the former, in line with the views of Suzuki and Royama, Teranishi
argued that the rigid segmentation of the financial system enabled the BOJ to
pursue an accommodating monetary policy while maintaining a wedge between its
own discount rate and call money rates.  Implementation of an accommodating
monotary policy was facilLtated by window guidance, which was mainly applied
on city banks and was generally more effective, the more segmented was  the
loan market.  But Teranishi also noted that the effectiveness of window
guidance was weakened over time by the use of arbitrage techniques, such as
lending through agent banks.  This forced the BOJ to extend the application of
window guidance to a wider range of banks (1986  p. 160).  Horiuchi (1984b) has
argued, however, that monetary pollcy was not accommodating since lf policy
was passive, the call money rate at which banks lent to each other would not
deviate from the official discount rate (p. 366).
As regards the implicit subsidy from regulated deposit rates, Teranishi
calculated that the value of the interest dlfferential between free and
regulated deposit rateo for the deposits held with clty banks amounted to
almost 25% of  the  value  of government subsidies paid to industry.  Teranishi
noted that the dividend policy and branch expansion of clty banks were
5regulated  so that  the  only outlets  for  these  subsidies  were either  lower  loan
rates  or retention  in  the banks  to be used  for supporting  further  expansion  of
business  credits 0 Horiuchi  also states  that  the  main  beneficiaries  of the
regulated  deposit  rateo  were the large  banks,  who  achieved  a higher  rate  of
profitability  than industrial  corporations  during  the  period  of high  growth.
Horiuchi  (1984a,  1984b  and 1990)  has  argued  that  nominal  lending
interest  rates  were not low  in Japan  during  the high-growth  period  because  the
widesoread  use  of compensating  balances  increased  the effective  cost  of
loans  . Hamada  and  Horiuchi  (1987)  mention  compensating  balances  ranging  from
11%  for  large  corporations  with city  banks  to over 40%  for  small  firms  wAth
saving.  banks  and credit  cooperatives
Horiuchi  has also  argued  that real interest  rates  were also high  if
nominal  rateo  were  deflated  by the  wholesale  price  index  rather  than  the
consumer  prlce  lndex. However,  as noted  by Koheaka  (1987),  real  deposlt  rates
were sllghtly  negatlve  if  they  were adjuisted  by the  consumer  price  lndex.
Tho segmented  nature  of the  Japanese  flnanclal  system  was also
hlghlighted  by Patrick  (1972).  Patrlck  emphaslzed  that  the  Japanese  financial
system  was characterlzed  by an inflexible  structure  of lnterest  rates  that  was
imposed  by the authorities. Thli  was  true  of both long  and short  rates  and
although  changes  ln compensating  balance  requlrements  were effected,  they  were
not sufficlent  to balance  demand  with supply. In such  a system,  credlt
rationing  worked  to the advantage  of the largest  borrowers  (pp.  115-6).
6  In  thli respect,  lt is  worth  noting  an important  dlfference  in
approach  b-tween  Japanese  and  A  nerisan  economists.  Many economists  in the  US
have  argued  that the  practlce  of compensating  balances,  that  was also very
widespread  among  American  banks,  was  not  used to increase  the effective  cost
of loans  but  rather  to bypass  the  prohibition  of intereat  payment  on demand
deposits. The argument  was that if  compensating  balances  involved  the
malntenance  of average  rather  than  minimum  balances,  then  a lower  loan rate
would  provide  compensatlon  for  balances  that corporations  would  normally  hold
with their  banks  for  their  day-to-day  transaction  needs. Horiuchi  does not
appear  to examine  thli  poseibility  even  though  the payment  of interest  on
demand  deposits  has  also been  prohibited  in  Japan.
MHoriuchi  Ls  not  clear  on whether  compeneating  balance  requirements
were based on minimum  or  average  balances nor on whether such balances were
placed  ln  demand  deposLts  (on  whlch  banks  were  not  allowed  to pay interest)  or
in lnterest-bearlng  tlme  deposlts. Suzukl  (1980),  however,  states  that
compensatlng  deposlts  were Interest  bearing  and  were based  on average
balances. Moreover,  Suzuki  suggests  that  compensating  balances  were,  to some
extent,  held  wllingly by corporatlons  both  because  they  provided  liquidity
agaLnst  future  credlt  controls  and  because  they  were  perceived  by banks  as
contributlng  to the cementlng  of closer  and  stronger  relatlonships. This  was
probably  truer for  larger  corporations  (pp.  46-47).
6Patrick  (1986)  underlines  the importance  of macro-industrlal  policy,
i.e.  the general  incentlves  to industry  to invedt,  modernLze  and  operate  at
internatlonally  competltive  levels  and  the favorable  environment  for  household
savLng,  mainly  the achievement  of high  growth  under  moderate  inflation.
Presumably  also  the general  dLuincentlves  to borrow  contrlbuted  to a high
level  of household  saving. But  Patrick  has  argued  that industry-specific
policLes  have  not  been invariably  successful  and  where  they have failed  (e.g.
in shipplng,  aircraft  and  oil refinLng),  they have Lnvolved  hlgh  costs  to
consumers,  savers  and  taxpayers  (pp  21-2).
Patrick  has also  emphasized  the poLnt  that low  cost and  blg subsidles
were not  a major  component  of credit  pollcieos Rather,  access  to funds  and
the cowbell  effect,  whereby  private  financLal  institutions  joined  in finaneing
particular  firms  or projects,  were far  more important  (Patrick,  1991).
From  the  Japanese  industrial  policy  literature  lt is  worth  noting  the
concluding  remarks  by Okuno  and Suzumura  in a volume  on the Industrial  Policy
of Japan  co-edited  with Komiya  (1988). In it,  Okuno  and Susumura  emphasize
that the  high  growth  era  was  an era  of conflict  between  policymakers  and
firms.  Industrial  policy  was  most  effective  when it  supplmented the  price
mechanism  and  encouraged  competition. It  was least  effective  when it  trled  to
eliminate  excess  competition  and  used cLrect  interventLon  to Lnduco
restructuring  and  rationallzatLon  of industrLal  sectors. Government
intervention  and assistance  to declining  Lndustries  which  involved  the
creation  of rece-7qion  cartels  and  the  relocatLon  of labor  were seen  as having
mixed  results. Thw  use  of trade  restrictions  to protect  and  foster  Lnfant
industries  or to create  a  countervailing  force  ag*inst  foreign  monopolies
generally  had  positive  effects  as  did the special  tax  measures  and low-
interest  loans  that  were provided  to some industries,  especLally  the lron  and
steel  and  shipbuildLng  industries,  and  small  and  medium-size  firms. Okuno  and
Suzumura  also  emphasize  the  positive  role  of government  ln collectlng,
processing  and  diffusing  lnformation.
The third.aroul.  The  third  group  argues  that Lndustrial  pollcy  and
government  intervention  ln credit  allocation  had  a negatlve  effect  on the
allocation  of resources  and  economic  growth. According  to Patrick  (1986
p.20),  the  most articulate  proponent  of this  view  is Trezise (1976  and  1983)
who has  attributed  Japan's  success  to the  entrepreneurs  and  businessmen  who
took advantage  of macrostability  and  market  mechanisms  and  engaged  in
industrial  investment  and  exports. TreziLs  mentions  the  many industrialists
who prospere4  without  explicLt  government  support. HLrono (1988)  has also
argued  that  Japan's  industrial  adjustment  process  was slow  and  probably  much
costlier  in social  terms  as a result  of  MITI's  intervention  than it  would  have
been if it  had  been left  to the operation  of markets  (pp.  244-S).
This  group  could  also  include  papers  from  the  Japaneso  industrial  policy
literature  that  have  challenged  the  vlew  that  Japan's  high  growth  and
successful  industrialization  were  masterminded  by MITI.  In discussing
industrial  performance  in  the high  growth  era,  Komiya  (1988)  includes  a  long
list  of industries  that achieved  remarkable  success  with little  government
support  (sewing  machines,  cameras,  bicycles,  motorcycles,  pianos,  zippers,
transistor  radLos,  color  television  sets,  tape  recorders,  audio  equipment,
7fishing  gear,  watches  and  clocke,  calculators,  electric  wlre,  m6chine  tools,
numerically  controlled  machLne  toolo,  textlle  machLnery,  agricultural
machLnery,  insulatoro,  communications  equLpmcnt,  ceramLco, nd robots).
Komlya  states  that  the  majorLty  of firma  ln  these  sectors  started  from  nothLng
after  the  war, developed  under  their  own  power  wlthout  any  dependence  on
lndustrlal  protection  and  promotlon  or any  particular  benefLts  from LndustrLal
polLcy  meaeures  and  would  strongly  disagree  wlth  the statement  that lndustrlal
policy  in  Japan  was  extremely  strong,  systematLi  and  comprehensive  (pp.  7-8).
Other  authors  who havo  expressed  crLtLcal  vliwo  about  the offoctLveneas  and
efficiency  of Lndustrial  polLcy  ln  Japan  include  Kosai,  Teuruta  and  Uekusa,
all ln  the  volume  edLted  by Komiya,  Okuno  and  Suzumura  (1988)
syn-tho  L
In attempting  to synthesize  the llterature  on the  effectiveness  of
credit  policy  in  Japan,  one is faced  wlth  a very serious  handicap. There  is
no readlly  avaLlable,  systematic  and  comprehensive  dLscussLon  of the volumes
of funds  involved,  the amounts  of subsidy  or the sectors  receiving
preferentLal  allocatLon. Much  of the  debate  L  directed  at refuting  extreme
posltions  taken  elther  by those  who  attribute  Japan's  economic  success  to the
LmplementatLon  of its  industrial  pollcy  and Lts  alleged  emphasis  on supporting
big firms  and  bLg  banks  or, at the  other  end  of the spectrum,  hy those  who
deny  any  positive  impact  from  such  interventLon.
However,  an lmportant  contributlon  is  made  by those  who chart  a  mlddle
road,  hlghllghting  the  positive  aspects  of Japanese  LndustrLal  policy  but  also
underscorLng  its  many limitations. These  commentators  agree  that  the
financLal  sector  of Japan  ln  the high-growth  era  was  highly  segmented. This
segmentatlon  may have  been  necessitated  by the  underdevelopment  of the
securities  markets,  the  experience  of very high inflation  in the 1940s  and
early  1950s,  and  the  lnformatlon  needs  of the high  growth  era, but it
conferred  to the authorities  greater  control  over the  allocatlon  of financial
resources. However,  contrary  to the  assertions  of some  authors  (e.g.  Zysman
and  Eccleston)  there  is no evidence  that  the  BOJ used  window  guLdance  to
influence  the  sectoral  allocation  of credit,  other  than  perhaps  to discourage
lendlng  for  speculatLve  purposee.
In  practice,  the  Japanese  industrlal  policy  seems  to have aimed  at three
different  objectives: To pLck and  support  wlnners,  especially  in areas  where
Japan  could  enjoy  a dynamic  comparatlve  advantage;  to phase  out losers,  i.e.
to help  the restructurLng  and  reductLon  of capacity  of those  industries  where
Japan  was  no longer  Lnternatlonally  competitive;  and  to provide  the  necessary
8  However,  as already  noted  above,  Okuno  and  Suzumura  in  theLr
concluding  remarks  have adopted  a  more favorable  attltude  towards  the
LmplementatLon  of LndustrLal  policy  in  Japan.
8Lndustrial  Lnfrastructure 9. Thus,  government  regulation  and  lnterventlon  in
the  fLnancLal  muetor,  through  MITI,  the  Mlnlitry  of Plnance  (MOF)  or the  Bank
of Japan (BOJ)#  dld not focus  exclusLvely  on securing  cheap  fLnance  for  the
most dynamic  sectors,  but  appeared  to aim for  a balance  between  the claLm,  of
dLfforent  sectors.
If  theme  three  elements  of an LndustrLal  polLcy  are  accepted,  then  one
would  expect  a number  of practLcal  LmplicatLons  to be reflected  ln the
allocation of funds.  For Lnstance,  fLnancLal support to successful, dynamLi
industrLes  would decline rapldly over tLme  since am a  result of thelr very
success,  much  industrLes  would  be expected  to repay  thelr  loans  and  achieve
financial  Lndependence.  Even if successful  companLes  may contLnue  to rely  on
bank loans  for  financLng  their  expansLon  plans,  they  would  presumably  cease  to
receLve  support  from  government  funds. On the  other  hand,  fLnancLal  support
to declLnLng  lndustrles  would  probably  last for  longer  periods. A basLc
objectLve  of pollcy  would  be to smooth  the adjustment  process  and  reduce
capacLty  ln an orderly  faahion  ln  order  to mLnLmLze  dLilocatLons  ln labor
markets  and  reglonal  economLes. Thus,  the  provloLon  of government  financLal
support  li likely  to delay  the  adjustment,  but  whether  thLi ie  economically
benefLcLal  or not  would  depend  on the  balance  between  the  bonefits  and  cruts
Lnvolved. Flnally,  fLnancLal  support  for  Lndustrial  lnfrastructure  would
depend  on the capltal  Lntensity  of such  Lnfrastructure.  In earller  periods
when Lnfrastructure  meant  investments  ln electrLeLty,  transportation  and  other
heavy  infrastructure,  financLal  support  was perhaps  prolonged. But ln  modern
times,  much of support  ie  directed  towards  research  and  development  as well as
education  and  traLnLng  and  this should  not  require  as large  outlays  of capital
as  the  development  of public  utilltles.
Some  economists  have  noted  the  decline  in the  proportion  of FILP  funds
that  went to support  key  Lndustries. Ogura  and  YoshLno  (1988)  show  that from
23.6%  of the  total  ln 1953-55,  the  share  fell  to 16.6%  in 1956-60,  9.9%  in
1961-65,  6.3% in 1966-70,  3.7% in 1971-75  and 2.9%  ln 1976-81  (p.  135).  The
share  of  FILP  funds  that  supported induatrial  infrastructure  remained broadly
constant  at  around  24%,  except  for  the  most recent  pariod  when it fell  to 18%.
Funds  for  the  modernization  of low  productivity  sectors,  such  as small  and
medium-size  LndustrLes,  also accounted  for  a fairly  constant  share  of around
20%.  However,  funds  for  the improvement  of livlng  conditLons  lncreased
ateadlly  from  23%  in 1953-55  and reached  47%  in 1976-81.
But ln relatlon  to GNP  or to the financLng  needs  of key industries,  the
relatLve  Lmportance  of financlal  support  to key LnduatrLes  may  not  have  fallen
am  much.  This is  because  the  total  resources  of the  Trust  Fund  Bureau  and  of
the FILP  program  Lncrsased  over  time  wlth  regard  to both the  total  assets  of
the flnanclal  system  and  gross  national  product  as a  result  of the  great
success  of the  postal  savings  bank  ln mobilizing  household  deposlts.
9  The  exteneive  flnanclal  support  for  some  traditLonal  and
relatively  ineffLcient  Lndustries,  such  as agriculture,  could  be seen  more as
a  social  polLey  or a response  to polLtLcal  pressures  and less  as a component
of an active  Lndustrial  pollcy.
9Although  it is not  dLecussed  ln any  detall,  the amount  of subsLdy
involved  ln  prferentLal credLts  is generally  coneidered  to  have been low,  ln
the  reglon  of I  or 2 percentage  poLnts  below  market  rates. The subsidy  was
larger  for  loans  of government  flnancLal  Lnstitutions. For small  firms,  the
Lntereat  rate subsidy  probably  covered  the  dLfferentLal  between  the  rate  on
loans  obtaLned  from  Lnformal sources  and  money  market  rates.
Wlth regard to the general level of nominal and real Lnterest  rates,
there  is some  debate  Ln  the literature. The impact  of compeneating  balances
on the  offectlve  nominal  cost  of loan.  depends  on the  size  of balances,  on
theLr  niature  (i.e.  whether  they  are  based  on average  or  minimum  balances)  and
on theLr  return  (whether  and  how  much  Lnterest  they  earn).  If large
corporations  were requLred  to  maintaLn  balance.  equal  to 10%  of loans  and  Lf
the loan  rate  was 7%,  then  the  offectLve  lo^n  rate  would  rise  to 7.78%  lf
balances  earn zero  lnterest,  to 7.44%  lf tney  earn 3% Lnterest  and  to 7.22%  if
they  earn St interest. For  omaller  companLes  where  componsatLng  balances  were
reported  to reach  as high as 40%,  the effective  loan  rate  would  rise from  7%
to 11.67%  with zero  interest  on compensating  deposits,  to 9.67%  wlth 3%
lnterest  and  to 8.33%  wlth 5% Lnterest. Thus,  the impact  of compensatLng
balances  may range  from  a trlvial  increase  of a few  basLs  poLnts  to an
escalation of Lnterest  costs of nearly 500  basLe poLnto.  FaLlure to provide
more specLfLe  details  about  the  oLsze,  nature  and return  of compensatLng
balances  weakens  the argument  that  the  effective  cost  of loans  was
substantially  higher  than  posted  rates.
Moreover,  it li  wLdely  accepted  that  Japanese  fLnancial  policy
dLcouraged the supply  of loans  to households  both for  consumer  credlt  and for
housLng  fLnance  purposes. This  had  clear  implications  for  the level  of
household  consumptlon  and  savLng. GLven  the  limLted  avaLlabillty  of credit
faeLlitLes  to households  and  the  persistent  wedge  between  producer  and
consumer  prices,  it  is dlfficult  not  to conclude  that  the  general  level  of
Lnterest  rates  was lower  than  it would  otherwise  have  been.
The argument  that  real  rates  of intereat  were high  durlng  the  high
growth  era  is premiLed  on  the  claim  that  the  wholesale  prlce index  (WPI)  is  a
more appropriate  deflator  than  the  consumer  price  index  (CPI). To say  the
least,  thLi is rather  contentious. It is based  on the  argument  advanced  by
McKinnon  that  the  WPI is a better  deflator  because  lt represents  the cost  of
claims  on a broad  basket  of tradable  and  tangible  goods,  whereas  the  CPI
depOnds  heavlly  on nontradable  and LntangLble  services  (McKLnnon  1989,  p.
35) . In any  case,  most emplrlcal  studles  agree  that  the  rate  of Lnterest
le  not a  major  determLnant  of saving  ln  most countrles  while,  against  the
McKinnon  thesoi,  one  could  argue  that  the  CPI  provLdes  a  better  lndlcatlon  of
the purchasing  power  of household  savLngs.
10  According  to MeKLnnon,  manufactured  goods  are  the main  alternative
to financLal  assets. However,  as Gelb (1989,  p. 3)  emphasized,  property  (and
perhaps  gold  and ot)  gr  nonmanufactured  pre6cius  metals)  occupy  a  domlnant
posLtion  ln household  portfolLos  in most  developLng  countries.
10Although  there  la conslderable  debate  about  the  existence  of
"artiLflcally"  low  interest  rates  and about  the  quantltatlve  Lmportance  of
preferentlal  credlt  achemes,  moot commentatora  agree  that low  cost  was not  a
cruclal  part of governoent  support. Instead,  greater  emphases  L  placed  on
the  availablilty  of flnance  and  the  cowbell  or slgnaling  effects  of government
.accLon  .
one  surprlslng  feature  of  the literature  on the  operation  and
effectiveness  of  credit  pollles ln  Japan  la the  absence  of any  reference  to
the  potentlal  for  abuse  and  mliuse  of subsldlzed  facilitles  and  of any
dlscusslon  of the  precondltions  that  are  requlred  for  a successful
implementatlon  of an actlve  industrlal  credlt  policy. The  problems  of adverse
selection  and  moral  hazard,  that  have  bedevlled  thl  credit  polLcies  of  many
other  countrles,  generally  receive  scant  attentlon . Perhaps  thls  reflects
the  hlgh  level  of efficleacy  of the  Japanese  clvll  servlce  and  the  monitorlng
capabilitles  of banks  b.ut  lt is an lisue  that requires  special  attentlon  and
will be coneldered  ln greater  detaLl  after  the  examination  of  the  Korean
experlence.
The  Korean  EXROerenAM
The llterature  on  the  effectiveness  of  credit  and  industrlal  pollcy  in
Korea  cannot  be eaeily  dlvided  into  the  same  groups  as that  of Japan. Very
few  authors,  if  any,  have  challenged  the  vlew  that  government  lnterventlon  was
extenslve  ln  Korea.  No authors  have  argued  that industrlal  and  credit  policy
in Korea  was  elther  exaggerated  or dld not  matter  much.  But,  at the  same
time,  the  argument  that  government  intervention  may  have  retarded  growth  by
distorting  lncentlves  and  resource  allocatlon  is  made  more  frequently  and  more
forcefully  ln  the case  of Korea  than ln  the case  of Japan.
In addltion,  very few  authors  have  adopted  a  purlit  position  ln  the case
of Korea,  arguing  either  that industrlal  pollcy  was hlghly  successful  or that
it had  negatlve  results  and  retarded  growth. Rather,  the  majorlty  of authors
have  highllghted  both  the  beneflts  and  costs  of industrial  policy  and  assessed
speclflc  pollcy  actlons  rather  than  government  interventlon  ln  general. Thus,
in the  dLecuselon  that follows  the literature  on credlt  pollcies  ln Korea  will
be classlfied  by type of argument. It  wlll first  review  arguments  that
hlghlight  the  benefits  of actlve  credlt  pollcles  and  then  conslder  those  that
focus  on the  costs  of such  policles.
The  operatlon  of credlt  polLcy  ln  Korea  has  gone through  three  dlatlnct
phases. In the 1950S  and  1960s,  credit  pollcy  was  not lndustry  speclflc  but
was  orlented  towards  partlcular  actlvltLes,  mainly  exports  and  lndustrial
lnvestment  (Cho,  1989  and  World  Bank,  1987). Credlt  policy  was inltlally
supplemented  by  export  promotlon  measures  that Lncluded  the  use  of multiple
exchange rates, direct cash payments, permission to borrow ln foreign
I1  Elston  (1981)  mentions  that  some  prlorlty  lendlng  Ln the  aftermath
of the first  oLl crlesi  was later  ldentified  as having  been  used for
speculatlon  ln land  and  commodltles,  thus  contrlbutlng  to the subsequent  burst
of inflation  (p.  516).
11currenciea  and  pearmision  to import  restricted  commodities  under  the  export-
import  link (World  Dank,  1987,  p. 33).  The  export-import  link  allowed
exporters  to benefit  from scarcity  rents in  heavily  protected  domestic
markets. Most of these  measures  were replaced  in  the course  of the 19608  by
export  incentives  that  relied  on tariff  exemptions  for  inputs  to export
producto. However,  access  to subsidized  credit  continued  to be a  major  plank
of export  oriented  policies. Export  performance  was also  encouraged  by the
uoo of trade promotion meetings,  company  specLfic export targets, close
monitoring  of exports,  and  special  awards  for  export  achievement.
Credlt  policy  changed  drastically  in the 19709  during  the  drive  for  the
development  of heavy  and  chemical  industries  (HCI). During  the HCI  drive,  the
government  relied  heavily  on its  control  of the  entlre  credit  system  and
provided  Ostrategic"  industries  preferential  accesa  at substantially
subsidized  rates (World  Bank,  1987,  p. 39).  The  use  of policy  loans  was
pervasive. In  the 1970s,  between  43%  and 50%  of  total  lending  went for
preferential  finance. Although  the  HCI  drive  was overly  ambitious,  HCI
exports  reached  56%  of all  exports  in 1983 (p.  45).
During  the 1970e,  government  policy  was  based  on the  development  and
growth  of business  conglomerates  with  the  ability  to invest  in large  scale
plants  that could  be internationally  competitive. The  successes  and  failures
of the  HMC drive  forced  a change  in government  approach  in  the  1980s.  First,
the  government  became  involved  in industrial  and financial  restructuring  of
industries  and  companies  in distress. As in  Japan,  Korean  industrial  and
credit  policy  started  to be preoccupied  not  only  with "picking  winners"  but
also  with "phasing  out losers". In addition,  the focus  of policy  was
reoriented  towards  producing  a  more balanced  industrial  sector  that  would  not
be so  dominated  by a few  business  conglomerates.  As a result,  lending  to
small  and  medium-size  firms  received  greater  attention  (World  Bank,  1987,  pp.
48-56).
Benefit  sf  credit 2l1icies,  Perhaps,  the  most ardent  advocate  of the role  of
government  intervention  in  promoting  industrialization  in  Korea is  Amaden
(1989). Amsden  maintains  that in late-industrializing  countries,  the  state
intervenes  with subsidies  deliberately  to distort  relative  prices  in order  to
stimulate  industrialization  and  economic  activity. This  has  been true  of most
late-industrializing  countries  but in  the case  of Korea (as  well as  Japan and
Taiwan),  Amsden  argues  that  the state  has  exercised  discipline  over subsidy
recipients  by impooing  strLct  performance  standards  in  exchange  for  the
subsidies  (p.  8).  Amsden  highlights  the  use of import  protection,  export
promotion,  industrial  licensing,  bias  towards  the large  business  conglomerates
and  availability  of cheap  debt finance  as  the  main instruments  of industrial
policy  that  emphasized  the  development  of industrial  exports  in sectors  with
high  value  added.
Many other  authors  have  underscored  the  role  of government  intervention
in  Korean  industrialization.  Kuznets  (1985)  argued  that credit  allocation  and
control  of access  to foreign  exchange  were perhaps  the  main  means  of achieving
tho  government's  economic  goals. The  typical  enterprise  was highly  leveraged
and  thus especLally  vulnerable  to the reduction  or withdrawal  of credit  (p.
53).  Dornbusch  and  Park (1987)  noted  that  Korea's  policies  did not  represent
12a  laiseez-faire  approach;  Lntervention  ln  the form  of trade  restrictions,
subsidies  and  credit  allocation  was  pervasive  (p.403). They  aloo argued  that
economLc  externalities  and  market  imperfectione  provided  the  underlying  logLc
for  import  substitution  and  export  promotion. Tariffs  and licensing  were  used
to create  a sheltered  market  for  the  development  of lnfant  lndustries,  whlch
were later  directed  towards  the  world  market  by subsidies,  credit  and  exchange
rate  pollcies. The  credit  eystem  channelled  resources  at subsidized  rates  to
preferred  activlties.
Cho (1989)  referred  to the  interest  rate  reform  of the  mid-1960s  when
real  deposit  rates  were increased  and  argued  that  the reform  increased  the
role  of government  in credit  allocation  because  of  the rapid  expanoion  of bank
deposits  that  were  under  strict  government  control. DLrected  credit  programs,
such  as export  finance,  were then  provided  with  greater  subsidy  (p.92).  Cho
also  noted  that  the  proportion  of credit  allocated  to the industrial  sector
relative  to its  contribution  to GNP  was  much  higher  in  Korea  than in  other
countries,  while  consumer  loans  and loans  to "unproductive"  sectors  such  as
services  and  leisure  were limited  (p.  95).
An important  feature  of credit  policy  in  Korea  was  the  coercive  nature
of government  intervention.  The  World  Bank (1987)  noted  that industrial
policy  encouraged  entrants  with  minimum  equity  stakes  and stimulated
competition  but then  selected  future  industry  leaders  on the "survival  of the
fastest  growing"  criterion  (p.  121).  Firms  that failed  to meet  performance
standards  and  expand  exports  were  denied  additional  credit  or had  their loans
recalled  while  successful  firms  were given  further  access  to credit  on
preferential  terms. The importance  of the  discipline  exercised  by government
is  also  emphasized  by Amsden  (p.  140).
Unlike  Japan  where  credit  policy  does  not  appear  to have involved  large
subsidies  but  to have  emphasized  access  to credit  facilities  for  priority
borrowers,  in  Korea  interest  rate  subsidies  were  on occasion  quite  large.
Cole and  Park (1983,  p. 190)  and  the  World  Bank (1987,  p. 83) show  that  export
and investment  finance  were  made available  at rates  that  were lower  than
market  rates  by between  5 and  24 percentage  points  in the 1960s  and  1970s.
Cole  and  Park also  report  studies  that  showed  subsidies  of between  7% and  28%
of  the  gross  capital stock of the manufacturing sector between 1970 and 1976
(p.  191).  However,  Rhee (1990)  has  argued  that access  to finance,  especially
by direct  and  indirect  exporters,  was  more important  that  the cost subsidy.
Koo (1984)  noted  the incentives  provided  to exporters  in the 1960s,
which  included  exemption  from  import  duties  of intermediate  goods  that  were
used as  inputs  for  export  products,  reduction  of corporate  taxse  for
exporters,  and  access  to preferential  financing  facilities,  but  argued  that
the industrial  incentive  system  had  a marginal  effect  on export  growth  in  this
period,  which  followed  closely  the  pattern  dictated  by international
comparative  advantage  (pp  6-7).
Costs of credit  2ollcies, Much  of the discussion of the  costs of credit
policies  focussee  on the  experience  in the  1970s  when  the  HCI drive  was under
way.  This was influenced  by the  overcapacity  of  many heavy  industrial  sectors
13that suffered  large  losees  in  the  aftermath  of  the second  oil crisis  and  the
worldwide  economic  recession  of the  early  1980s.
Kwak (1984)  argued  that  the industrLal  restructuring  strategy  of the
1970e  was  very costly. The  preferred  oectors  expanded  productlon  capacity  too
rapidly,  whlle  firms  dld  not  have sufficLent  time  to accumulate  experLence  and
dlgest  new  technologLes.  The  resultlng  low  quallty  products  could  not  be
exported  and  most firms  were characterized  by excess  capacity,  high  productlon
costs  and low  product  quallty. The  unsupported  sector  was forced  to borrow  at
very  high  rates  from  the informal  market  and  the  dual  nature  of the credit
system  created  a  major imbalance  ln  the Lndustrial  structure  of the  country.
Kwak has  also  argued  that  the low  Lnterest  rate  policy  of the  government
caused  an acceleration  of inflation,  a lowerlng  of savings  and  a deterLoration
Ln the  external  balance. Kwak's  main conclusion  is that  government  should  be
patLent  and should  allow  private  firms  to make  their  own  deciLsons. Resources
should  be allocated  by the  market  mechanism  wLth  the Lnterest  rate playlng  lts
assigned  role.  Government  should  be extremely  careful  in providing  sector
speciLfc  incentLves  and  direct  government  intervention  in credlt  allocatLon
can hardly be justLfied (pp. 43-47).
Koo (1984)  also  argued  that  the lndustrial  targeting  and Lmport
substitutLon  policies  pursued  in the 1970s  involved  hlgh  economic  costs.
These  lncluded  the  building  of excess  capacity  Ln  the strateglc  HCI Lndustries
and  the  neglect  of light  manufacturLng  (pp  11-16).
The  World  Bank (1987)  stated  that  the  HCI  drive  was  overambitLous  and
resulted  ln serLous  misallocation  of resources,  although  lt also  noted  that
many of Lts  goals  were in fact  achleved. In evaluatlng  results  of speciflc
LniustrLes,  the  World  Bank  underscored  the  major  tochnLcal  achievements  Ln the
steel  Lndustry  and  other sectors  and  the  mlxed  results  of the shipbuildLng  and
motor  car  sectors  (p.  45).
However,  the  World  Bank  also  discussed  extensively  the  problems  caused
by the overcapacity in some industries and the large  losses suffered  by
indlvldual  firms  or business  groups. It Lncluded  a  major  discuseLon  of
LnduatrLal  pollcy  Lssues  wLth regard  to declLnlng  industrLes,  newly  emerging
growth  sectors,  conglomerate  groups  and small  and  medium-size  firms. Although
it  generally  advocated  market-based  policLes,  the  World  Bank allowed  for
government  intervention  in partlcular  sectors. For  thLs  purpose,  lt developed
a set  of polLcy  decLiLon  rules  that  could  guLde  government  Lntervention  in
industrial restructuring  (pp.  113-121).
The  World  Bank,  and  other  authors,  also  highlight  two  adverse  effects  of
active  LndustrLal  and  credit  polLcies. The first  ia  the negative  Lmpact  on
the  development  of the financial  sector. In  Korea,  the large  losses  suffered
by many industrial  groups  have  weakened  the fLnancLal  positLon  of commercial
banks,  which  have experienced  a  decline  ln theLr  relatLve  Lmportance  in  the
Korean  financLal  system. Moreover,  government  Lnvolvement  in credit  decision
making  and  ln restructurLng  operations  has  deprLved  commercial  banks  of the
opportunity  to develop  thelr  own skills  in approving  credits  and  organizing
workouts. Cole  and Park (1983)  have  argued  that  the segmentatlon  of the
financial  system,  which  may have contrLbuted  to Lts  weakness,  may have  been
14the result of a delLberate effort on the part of the government to facilLtate
lts dlrected credLt allocation (p. 185)e
The second effect is the problem of morA  hazard.  In general, the
goverrnment  wllingness  to Lntervene ln restructurLng creates sLgnLficant
moral hazard.  OLven the proopect of government rescue ln the event of adverse
buolness condLtLons, firms are more willing to undertake rLsky strategLes,
whlle banks may be wlling  to flnance such rLsky strategLes  because  they  also
expect to be baLled out by government LnterventLon.  Moreover, once adverse
condLtLons materLalize, firms and lenders way postpone corrective actlon and
adjustment and thus Lncrease the economic cost of restructurLng (World Bank,
1987, p. 116).  Distre6s fLnance has an lmportant part to play ln  supportlng
flrms  that  face fLnancial dlfflcultles but are otherwLse fundamentally sound.
But government LnterventLon must be selectLve and should avold dLitorting
Lncentives for risk taking.
SXnthgaL.J  As Ln the case of Japan, LndustrLal and credit pollcy ln Korea
were most successful when they supplemented the prLce mechanism and aimed for
achlevLng Lnternational competitiveness.  However, the policy faltered when it
forced a pace of adjustment that was too fast for fLrms to dLgest.
The general vlew regarding the Korean experience in the 1960s is captured
well by Cole and Park (1983)  who argued that although export Lndustries
reoeived considerable financial support it ls not easy to determine the extent
to which that support was crucial for promoting exports.  Thls li because
exports receLved many other forms of subsidLes.  Moreover, Cole and Park noted
that it may be argued that exports could have risen  as fast as they did under
a liberallzed financLal system and free fLnancial markets if all relative
prLces, Lncluding the exchange rate, had been maLntained at a market level.
However, they also noted that this is a  proposition  that  it is very difficult
to prove or disprove.  What the Korean experLence dld show, however, according
to Cole and Park, is that the emphasLi of financial policy on savings
mobilization and export  promotion was not Lnappropriate in view of the
successful expanslon of exports and healthy growth of the economy (p. 269).
Dornbusch and Park (1987) emphasize the leadlng role played by
government in all stages of industrial adjustment.  Durlng the early stages of
LndustralizatLon,  exports ware singled out for support with subsidies, credit
and an attractlve real exchange rate.  When the situation called for more
capLtal-intensive and technology-Lntenaive industries, import restrLctions and
flnance were amply provided to stLmulate lnvestment and generate profitability
for Lnfant industries.  And when the economy became too complex, government
polLcy placed greater emphasis on liberalized markets, while industrLal policy
was reorLented towards small and medLum-size firms and towards supporting
research and development for hlgh-tech Lndustries (pp. 438-9).
Westphal  (1990) notes that the Korean government'e industrial policies
have been used withLn the context of a conaistent strategy of
industriliLzation.  The objectLve of the strategy has been to bulld
comparative advantage ln new Lndustries or to rebulld Lt ln old ones.
Westphal concludes that selectLve intervention has greatly contrLbuted to
Korea's remarkable succOes.  But Westphal also argues that to be effective
15selective  intervention  through  credit  rationing,  import  protection  and  other
measuree  must  be combined  with coercive  interventions  to compel  warranted
Lnvestments  to  reallze  the latent  externalities  lnvolved  (pp.  53=56).
The  preceding  diecussion  shows  that  credit  policLes  may stimulate
industrialization  and  economLc  growth  if they  malnly  correct  for  the
shortcomings  of financial  markets  and  do not  involve  large  subLdiese  that
diLtort  Lncentives. Credit  and Lndustrial  poliieLs  work  best  if  they
encourage  competitLon  and supplement  the  price  mechanism,  for instance  by
offering  amall  credLt  subsLdLes  but avoiding  the Lmposition  of lendLng  quotas
and  the  detaLled  directLon  of credit  funds. However,  many  economists
emphasLze  that a number  of prerequListe  conditLons  must be met for  credit
policLes  to work.  The relative  success  of credit  poliLcies  in Japan  and  Korea
ia  attributed  to thelr  well functioning  bureaucracies,  the  effectiveness  of
monltoring  and  the  hLgh  degree  of financial  discipline. These  have  limlted
the  dLversLon  of subsidized  credit  funds  into  speculatLve  assets  and  have
ensured  that  credit  policies  in  these  two  countries  have  not suffered  from  the
problems  of adverse  selectLon  and  moral  hazard  that have  bedevlled  directed
credit  programs  and  credit  subsidLes  in  other  countrLes. In  additlon,  the
importance  of maintaining  macroeconomic  stability,  which  Lmplies  moderate
inflatLon  and small  budget  deficLts,  is also stressed.
The  absence  of  these  preconditions  from  many  developing  countries  lead
many  economists  to conclude  that  the  positive  experLence  of Japan  and  Korea
wLth credlt  and Lndustrial  policLes  cannon  be easLly  repllcated. However,  the
same  preconditLons  seem  to be required  for  the successful  operation  of market-
based  polLcLes. For Lnstance,  there  is now  widespread  agreement  that
macroeconomie  stabllity,  good lnformation  systems,  effectlve  monitoring  and
fLnancLal  dLcipline are  essential  for  the smooth  functlonlng  of efficient
financlal  systeme. The  question  for  developLag  countrLes  is  whether  there  is
scope  for  well  deelgned  and  narrowly  focussed  dlrected  credit  programs  in the
transitlon  from lnefficient  and  malfunctlonlng  financlal  systems  to modern  and
efficient  ones.
From  an economic  viewpoint  there  are  two potential  errors  that  can  be
made ln financial  markets  with  or without  credit  policLes:  providlng  finance
for  unproductive  purposes  or to unprofitable  firms  and  denying  credit  from
productLve  purposes  or profLtable  firms. Both  errors  waste  resources  and slow
economLc  growth. Mistakes  are  unavoidable  even  under  fully  privatized  and
"undirected"  financial  systems. The recent  experience  of Anglo-American  and
Scandinavian  financial  systems  underscores  thli  point. Applying  allegedly
sophLitLcated  techniques  of credit  appraisal  and  employing  large  numbers  of
skllled  and  experLenced  bank  examlners  have  not  prevented  Amerlcan  banks  from
maklng  large  mLetakes  and  misallocating  resources  from  an  economLc  point  of
view.  At the same  time  the  use  of directed  credit  programs  wlth large
subsidLes  and llttle  selectivity  have led  to massive  faLlures  in  many
developlng  countrLen.
Unfortunately,  neither  economLe  theory  nor  the  emplrical  literature
offer  clear,  unequivocal  answers  on the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of credit
16policies. Economic  theory  is  preoccupied  with formal  modeling  based  on
abstract  and implausible  assumptions. In its  LncreaeLngly  mathematLal form
lt  uses precLie  defLnLtLons  of concepts  that  bear lLttle  relatLonshLp  to the
Lmprecise  and fuzzy  nature  of  the  factors  that influence  economlc  behavLor  in
the  real  world.  For Lts  part,  most of the  empirical  literature  ouffers  from
the  GIGO syndrome  as most  of the collected  data  do not  correspond  ln substance
or qualLty  to the  data  that  would  be requLred  for  a  proper  empirLcal  testLng
of competing  theorLes.
Wlth  no clear  guldance  from  theory  and  with conflicting  evldence  from  the
experience  of different  countries  with directed  and "undirected"  fLnancial
systems  lt li difficult  to be very  dogmatLc  about  the role  of credit  policy  in
promoting  LndustriliLzation  and  economie  growth. A pragmatLc  approach  along
the lines  advocated  in  the followlng  passage  from  the concluding  chapter  of
the 1989  World  Development  Report  on Financial  Systems  and  Development  seems
most approprlate  untll  more  robust  evLdence  can  be produced  ln favor  or
against  the  use of credlt  policy  ao an Lnstrument  of an active  Lndustrial
policy.
"In  most developing  countries  government  Lntervention  in the  allocation
of credit  has  been  extensive. Although  a degree  of Lntervention  may have  been
useful  during  the  early  stages  of development,  many countrLea  have  come  to
recognLze  that this  policy  has  had  an adverse  effect  on Lndustrlal  and
financLal  development. The  evidence  suggests  that  directed  credit  programs
have  been  an inefflclent  way  of redistributing  income  and  of dealLng  with
imperfectLons  in the  goods  market. Some  programs  that  were  well designed  and
narrowly  focused,  however,  have  been reasonably  successful  in  deallng  with
specific  imperfectLons  ln  the financial  markets,  such  as a lack  of risk
capital.  In  the future,  governments  should  attack  the  condLtions  that made
dLrected  credlt  appear  desLrable  - LmperfectLons  ln markets  or extreme
inequalLties  in income  - inntead  of using  directed  credit  programs  and
interest  rate subsidies.
IMany  governments  are  unwilling  to elimlnate  directed  credits  entirely
but  are nonetheless  increasing  the  flow  of credit  to the  private  sector  and
reduclng  their  own role  in credit  allocatLon. Two prLnciples  should  guide  the
design  of any  remaining  programs. Firet,  there  can  be only  a limited  number
of priority  sectorss  a  wide variety  of directed  credit  programs  means  that
nothing  is  being  given  priority. Second,  governments  should  be conscLous  of
how lLttle  informatlon  they  have  in relation  to the information  they  would
need  to prLce  credit  for  different  sectors  approprlately.
With regard  to lnterest  rates,  the  aLm should  be to elLminate  the
difference  between  the subsidized  rate  and  the  market  rate.  The lowest
interest  rate should  not  be less  than  the  rate  charged  by the  commercial  banks
to prime  borrowers. Increaeing  the  availabillty  of credLt  to priority  sectors
should  be the  main focus  of the  remaining  directed  credit  programs,  since
experience  has shown  that generous  subsidLes  badly  distort  the allocation  of
resources.
ChargLng  nonprime  borrowers  the  prime  rate implies  a subeLdy  to the
extent  of the added  risk and  administrative  costs.  Instead  of forcing  the
17banks  to  cover  these  eost  by  charging  other  borrowers  more or  paying
deposLtors  lose,  the  authoritLes  would  be  better  advised  to  bear  the  costs
th.Amselveos  Dlrected  credit  admLnLitered  through  central  bank  redLeo'unts
rather  than  through  quantltatlve  allocatLons  forced  on  the  banks  promotes
voluntary  lendLng.  Governments  should  not,  however,  let  central  bank
redLicounts  become  a  signlficant  source  of  monetary  expanaLon.  Sectors  that
requLie  large  subsLdLes  should  be  dealt  w'th  ln  the  budget,  not  through  credLt
allocation.
Flnally,  it  seems  more  defeneible  to  provide  dLrected  credlts  for
certaln  activLtLes  (for  example,  exports  or  research  and  development)  or  for
specific  sorts  of  fLnancLng  such  as  long-term  loans  than  to  target  speeLfLi
subsectore  such  as  textleb  or  wheat.  TargetLng  specifLc  sectors  is  too  rlsky
Ln a  world  of  shiftLng  comparative  advantage."  (World  Bank,  1990,  p.  111)
180  ~JAPA
Aoki,,  MNaahiko (1988)s  InfSmation.  IncontLian and BargalinLo in the Jaranase
55nPAi.  CambrLdge UnLversity Press.
Aoki, MasahLko (1990)s  "Toward an EconomLi Model of the Japanese Firm",
Journal of SconomLc Literature, Volume 28, March 1990, pp 1-27.
Corb.tt* Jenny  (1987): "InternatLonal Perspectives on Finance - Evidence from
Japan"  Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Winter 1987.
ecaleston,  B. (1986): "The State, FLnance and Industry in Japan." in A.Cox
ed.,  The State.  Finance  and lndustrv:  A ComearAtive  Analmsis  gf Pogt  war
_Ands  In Six Advnced  2conmie.  Wheatuheaf Books, Brlggton, pp 60-79, 1986
Elaton, C.D. (1981):  "The Finance of Japanese Industry." Bank of  England,
Oauartrly Bulletin (December): 510-18.
Gelb, Alan (1989):  rinanLIa  Policies. Growh  and Efficiency, The World Bank,
PPR WorkLng Papers, WPS 202,  June.
Hamada, EoLchi and Aklyoshl Horluchi (1987):  "The PolLtieal Economy of the
FLnancial  Market",  ln Kozo  Yamamura  and  Yasukichi  Yasuba,  eds.,  The Political
co0nomy  of .JanX  , Vol. 1, Stanford University Press, 1987.
Hirono, RyokichL (1988)s  "Japan - Model for East Aslan Industrialization?" in
Belen Hughes, ad., Achieving Industrialzation  in East Asia, Cambrldge
Uanversity Press, pp.  241-259.
HorLachi, AkiyoshL (1984a):  "Economic Growth and Flnancial Allocatlon in
Postwar Japan", Brookines Discussion Pa2ers in InternAtional Econm  No.
18.
HoriuchL, AkLyeohL (1984b)s  "The 'Low Interest Rate Policy' and Economic
Growth ln Post War Japan". The Develocino EconoMies, December 1984, pp. 349-
371.
HorLuchi, AkLyoshi  (1989)s "Informational properties of the Japanese Financial
systm",  Jacan and the World EconoMX, 1, 255-278.
Horiuchi, AkiyoshL  (1990):  "Financial Liberalization: The Case of Japan",
EDI, mimOO.
HorLuchi, AkLyashL, Frank Packer and Shin'lichi  Fukuda (1988):  "What Role Has
the "Main Bank" Played in Japan", Journal of the Japanese and International
Zconomles, 2, 159-180.
iko., Kasuhito (1987): "Japan's FinancLal System: A Miero Approach", japae
Eonomic  dStudies,  Fall 1987, pp 60-77.
19Johnson,  Chalmers  (1978):  JApAn's  Public  Policy  CoMga_nle,  American
Enterprise  Institute  for  Public  Policy  Recearch,
Kohsaka,  Akira (1967)s  "Role  of  Flnance  ln  Economic  Developments  A  Case  Study
of  the  Rapid  Growth  Period  of Japan",  InstLtute  of DevelopLng  EconomLes,
mLmeoo
tomiya,  Ryutaro  (1988)e  "Introductlon"  ln  Ryutaro  Komlya  et al,  edea.,
IndustrLal  PoliLy  of Janan,  AcademLc  Press  Inc.,  pp.  1-22.
Kosal,  Yutaka  (1988):  "The  Reconstruction  PerLad",  ln  Ryutaro  KomLya et  al,
ode.,  InDustrial  Policy  of JaRAn,  Academic  Press  Inc.,  pp.  25-48.
Kuroda,  X  and  Y.  Orltanl  (1980):  "A ReexaminatLon  of the  UnLque  Features  of
Japan's Corporate Financial Structure - A ComparLson of Corporate Balance
Sheots Ln Japan and the UnLted States", Japanese Economlc StudLes, 7, 82-117,
Magaulner, Ira C. and Thomas M. Hout (1980):  Jananlee Industrial P21iev,
Institute of International StudLes, Unlverslty of CalifornLa, Berkeley.
McKLnnon, Ronald (1989):  "Financial LLberalizatLon and Economic Development  -
A Reassessment of Interest Rate  PolLices  in  Asia  and Latin America", Qxfgod
Revie  - of Economig PolLcX, Winter 1989.
OECD (1972)s  WhoInodugtrLal Policy of JAgen, OECD, Paris.
Ogura, Seiritsu and Naoyuki Yoshino (1988):  "The  Tax  System and the Flical
Investment  and  Loar Program",  in Ryutaro  KomLya  et al.,  edo.,  Indutrisl
Pol2icy  of Zaan,  Academic Press Inc., pp. 121-153.
OkLmoto, DanLel I. (1986)s "RegLme CharacterLtice  of Japanese Industrial
Policy", ln Hugh PatrLek, ed,  _aoans  High TechnolQav Indust  , UnLveraLty
of Washington Press, pp.  35-95.
Okuno, Masahiro and Kotaro Suzumura (1988):  "Conclusion", ln Ryutaro Komlya
et  al., eds., Xndustrijal  Policy of JpAn,  Academlc Press Inc., pp. 551-558.
Patrlck, Hugh (1972)s  "Flnance, Capltal Markets and EconomLc Growth ln Japan"
ln Arnold Sametz, ed., Financial DevelooMent and ZconoMic Growth, New York
UnLversLty Press, pp 109-138.
PatrLck, Hugh T. (1984)s "Japanese FLnancLal Development in HLstorLcal
Perspective, 1868-1980." In Gustav RanLe  et al., Com2aratLy  Develomnt
PersacstuLyj. Boulder: WeastvLew  Press.
PatrLck, Hugh (1986):  "Japanese Hlgh Technology IndustrLal Policy ln
ComparatLve Context" ln Hugh PatrLck, ed, J,20n'  Hiah
Unlverslty of Washlngton Press, pp. 3-33.
PatrLek, Hugh, and Henry Rosovsky ed. (1976)t  AsLA's  Y_w  iant - How the
Jananesn Anm=  Works, The BrookLngs InstLtutLon.
20Royama, Sholchl (1984)8  "The Japanese Financlal Systems Past, Present, and
Futuro"e Jacane  , Wlnter 1983-84.
Royama, Shoichl (1988): "The Financial System of Japans  A  New  View",  Japanoe
Econo  mc  SltdiaoB,  Sprlng 1988, Vol. 16, No. 3.
Suzuki, Youhio, Maney and BAnkina Ln Ontemaorarv  Janan, New Haven, Yale
UniversLty Press, 19800
TeranLihi, Juro (1986)s "EconomLc Growth and RelatLon of Financlal Markets:
Japanese ExperLence During Postwar Hlgh Growth Period." HLtotubaOshi Journal
of 92202l4L2,  Vol. 27, No. 2, December.
Teranlshl, Juro (1990):  "FLnancial System and the IndustrLalization of Japan
1900-1970", BaACA NazionAle de1 Lavoro OuArterlv Review, No. 174, September,
309-341.
Trozise, PhilLp H., wlth the collaboratlon of Yuklo Suzuki, (1976):
"PolLtLis, Government and Economic Growth Ln Jappr" in Hugh Patrick and Henry
Rosovsky,  e,  Asia's New Giant: H2w th  JADanese EconoMy Works, The BrookLngs
Institution, pp. 753-811.
TrezLe,  Phillp H. (1983):  "IndustrLal PolLcy is not the Major Reason for
Japan's  Success",  Brookines  Reviex,  1(3),  13-18.
Teuruta,  Toshimasa  (1988):  "The  Rapid  Growth  Era",  in  Ryutaro  Komiya  et al.,
eds.,  Industrial  Policy  of agan, AcademLc  Press  Inc.,  pp.  49-87.
Uekusa,  Haeu (1988):  "The  Oil CrLeLs  and  After",  in  Ryutaro  KomLya et  al.,
ods.,  IndustrLal  PQlCY  of Ja2an,  Academic  Press  Inc.,  pp.  89-117.
Uno,  HiLroya  (1980):  "The  ConceptLon  and  Evaluation  of  Japanese  Industrial
Policy'  in Kasuo  Sato,  ed,  IndustrX  and  Busines in  Jagan,  Sharpe,  White
Plains,  NY.
Vittas, Dimitri and  Roger Brown (1982):  Bank Lending-and IndustrLal
Invtnt,  BankLng Information ServLce, London.
Zyaman, John, government. Markets. and Growth: Financial Systems and the
_glitics  of Industrial Changa. Oxford, England: M. Robertson, 1983.
ma
Amuden, AlLeo  (1989)t Asia's Next Giant - outh Koreand  Late
IndustrLalization, Oxford Unlversity Press.
Cho, Yoon Jo (1989):  "Finance and Development - the Korean Approach", Oxford
Reiew  ofEconomic  P21icy, Winter 1989.
Cole,  David  and  Yung  Chul  Park  (1983)t  Flnancial  Develonment-in  Korea.  1945-
f2fl  Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press.
21Dornbusch, R. and Y. C. Park (1987)s "Korea Growth Policy." Brookin.  e
On  _c2nomi  AcivitY, No.  2, pp. 389-444.
Koo, Bohn-Yeung (1984):  "Role  of the Government Ln Korea's IndustrLal
Dovelopment", Koea  Dveloomont  Inatitutemakng  Pacer, No. 84-07: 1-
S2, October 1984.
Kuznots, Paul W (1985):  "Government and Economlo Stratogy ln Contemporary
South  Korea."  Pagific  Affairs,  58,  SprLng  1985,  pp.  44-67.
Kwack, Taewon (1984)s  "IndustrLal Restructurlng Experlences and PolLeLs  in
Korea in the 1970s",  KoreA Dtyevaoment Institute Working PaCe,  No. 84-
08. 1-51, August 1984.
Rhee, Yung Whee (1990):  The Role of Export Inltlatlves Ln EconomiL
Development - Lessons from Korea, The World Bank, mlmo.
Westphal, Larry (1990): Industrlal Pollcy ln an Export-Propelled Economy -
Lessons from South Korea's ExperLence", Journal of Economlc Perspectives,
Summer 1990, pp. 41-59.
World Bank (1987):  Korea: lanaaLna the Industrial TransLon,  The World Bank.
World Bank (1990)s  vJstel  Ams  gm-  and  Deealoceent, (The  World Development
Report 1989), Pollcy and Research SerLes No. 15, PRE, The World Bank.
22PRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
v  Author  Q  L  Q  forp
WPS730  Wage  and  EmploymLnt  Policies  in  Luis  A. Riveros  July 1991  V.  Charles
Czechoslovakia  33651
WPS731  Efficiency  Wage  Theory,  Labor  Luis  A. Riveros  July 1991  V. Charles
Markets,  and Adjustment  Lawrence  Bouton  33651
WPS732  Stabilization  Programs  in Eastern  Fabrizio  Coricelli  July 1991  R. Martin
Europe: A Comparative  Analysis  of  Roberto  de Rezende  Rocha  39065
the Polish  and Yugoslav  Programs
of 1990
WPS733  The  Consulting  Profession  in  Syed  S. Kirmani  July 1991  INUDR
Developing  Countries:  A Strategy  for  Warren  C. Baum  33758
Development
WPS734  Curricular  Content,  Educational  Aarcn Benavot  July 1991  0. Cristobal
Expansion,  and Economic  Growth  33640
WPS735  Traditional  Medicine  in Sub-Saharan  Jocelyn  DeJong  July 1991  0. Nadora
Africa: Its Importance  and Potential  31091
Policy Options
WPS736  Wages  and Employment  in  the  Simon  Cornmander  August 1991  0. Del  Cid
Transition  to a Market  Economy  Fabrizio  Coricelli  39050
Karsten  Staehr
WPS737  External  Shocks,  Adjustment  Delfin  S. Go  August 1991  A. Bhalla
Policies,  and Investment: Illustrations  37699
from a Forward-looking  CGE  Model
of the Philippines
WPS738  Tax Competition  and  Tax  Ravi  Kanbur  August 1991  J. Sweeney
Coordination:  When  Countries  Michael  Keen  31021
Differ  in Size
WPS739  Managing  Financial  Risks  in Papua  Jonathan  R. Coleman  August 1991  J. Carroll
New  Guinea: An  Optimal  External  Ying  Qian  33715
Debt Portfolio
WPS740  The  Onchocerciasis  Control  Program Bernhard  H. Liese  August 1991  0. Nadora
in West  Africa: A Long-term  John  Wilson  31091
Commitment  to Success  Bruce Benton
Douglas  Marr
WPS741  When  Does  Rent-Seeking  Augmen,  David  Tarr  August  1991  D. Ballantyne
the Benefits  of Price  and Trade  Refo.m  37947
on Rationed  Commodities?  Estimates
for Automobiles  and Color  Televisions
in PolandPRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
v"  Author  DL  for p1aper
WPS742  The  Cost of the District  Hospital:  A. J. Mills  August 1991  0. Nadora
A Case  Study  from Malawi  31091
WPS743  Antidumping  Enforcement  in the  Angelika  Eymann  August 1991  N. Artis
European  Community  Ludger  Schuknecht  37947
WPS744  Stainless  Steel  in Sweden:  Anti-  Gunnar  Fors  August  1991  N. Artis
dumping  Attacks  Good International  37947
Citizenship
WPS745  The  Meaning  of 'Unfair in U.S.  J. Michael  Finger  August 1991  N. Artis
Import  Policy  37947
WPS746  The Impact  of Regulation  on  Dimitri  Vittas  August 1991  W. Pitayatonakarn
Financial  Intermediation  37666
WPS747  Credit  Policies  in Japan  and  Korea:  Dimitri  Vittas  August 1991  W. Pitayatonakarn
A Review  of  the Literature  37666
WPS748  European  Trade  Patterns  After  the  Oleh Havrylyshyn  August 1991  N. Castillo
Transition  Lant Pritchett  37947
WPS749  Hedging  Commodity  Price Risks  in  Stijn Claessens  August 1991  S. Lipscomb
Papua  New  Guinea  Jonathan  Coleman  33718
WPS750  Reforming  and Privatizing  Poland's  Esra  Bennathan  August  1991  B. Gregory
Road Freight  industry  Jeffrey Gutman  33744
Louis  Thompson